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Abstract—The need for data trading promotes the emergence
of data market. However, in conventional data markets, both
data buyers and data sellers have to use a centralized trading
platform which might be dishonest. A dishonest centralized
trading platform may steal and resell the data sellers data, or
may refuse to send data after receiving payment from the data
buyer. It seriously affects the fair data transaction and harm the
interests of both parties to the transaction. To address this issue,
we propose a novel blockchain-based data trading framework
with Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) to provide a trusted
decentralized platform for fair data trading. In our design, a
blockchain network is proposed to realize the payments from
data buyers to data sellers, and a trusted exchange is built by
using a TEE for the first time to achieve fair data transmission.
With these help, data buyers and data sellers can conduct
transactions directly. We implement our proposed framework
on Ethereum and Intel SGX, security analysis and experimental
results have demonstrated that the framework proposed can
effectively guarantee the fair completion of data tradings.
Index Terms-Blockchain, Data trading, Trusted Execution
Environment
I. INTRODUCTION
Data has become a key asset in our economy, the utilization
of data can bring huge economic benefits or help us make
better desicision. For example, by analyzing the data of
the users product purchase history to generate personalized
recommendations, it has brought huge economic benefits to
e-commerce companies such as Amazon, Netflix and Alibaba.
Using artificial intelligence models trained on large-scale
medical data to predict and diagnose diseases has been used to
improve the quality of medical services. The performance of
these techniques depends heavily on the quality and quantity
of data, so the need for expanding the amount of data through
data trading arises, which promoted the emergence of data
market, such as DataExchange [7] and Datacoup [9].
A conventional data market includes three main participants,
namely: data seller, data buyer and centralized trading plat-
form. In a common trading process, the data seller sends the
data to a centralized trading platform and entrusts it to sell.
The data buyer browses the information and historical reviews
to the data on the centralized trading platform, and select the
data of interest to purchase. However, the centralized trading
platform may be dishonest and harm the interests of both
parties to the transaction. For example, dishonest centralized
trading platform may steal and resell the data sellers data, or
may refuse to send data after receiving payment from the data
buyer. It poses a huge challenge to conduct a fair data trading.
Blockchain is a distributed public ledger based on crypto-
graphic technologies first introduced by Nakamoto in 2008
[10]. It maintains a continuously growing list of ordered
records called blocks. Each block has a hash pointer to the
previous block and a Merkle Hash Tree (MHT) is employed
to integrate transactions into one block in an efficient way. The
advantages of blockchain include: decentralization, immutabil-
ity and transparency. And these advantages of blockchain
paved for fair data trading in data market.
In this paper, we design a blockchain-based data trading
framework (BDTF), which takes advantages of the blockchain
to build a decentralization platform for data trading. In our de-
sign, data buyers and data sellers conduct transactions directly
on the blockchain, which avoids risks caused by centralized
trading platforms. All payment records and reviews generated
by data buyers are faithfully recorded in the blockchain
through consensus protocol, and can be accessed by every
user of BDTF.
The decentralized nature of the blockchain has also brought
challenge to our work, which makes it difficult to ensure
fair payment of data tradings. For example, a malicious data
seller may defraud the data buyer by sending fake data, and
a malicious data buyer may refuse to pay after receiving
the authentic data. To address this important challenge, we
first build a trusted exchange by using Trusted Execution
Environment (TEE, such as Intel SGX [3], Sanctum [4] and
Keystone [8]) in BDTF to assist in the fair payment of the
transactions. During a trading process, the data seller sends
data to a trusted exchange first. Then the data buyer can
verify whether the data in the trusted exchange is he/she needs.
Finally, only when the trusted exchange detected the payment
from the data buyer to the data seller will it send the data to
the data buyer.
The rest of this paper is as follows. Section II briefly
introduces the background and related work. The design of the
framework is presented in Section III. In Section IV, security
and performance analysis are carried out. Finally, this paper
is concluded in Section V.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
A. Trusted Execution Environment
A Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) [11] is a secure
area in the processor and it can shield the confidentiality and
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integrity of the code and data inside from accesses by other
software, including higher-privileged software. There are many
TEEs have been proposed by both industry and academia,
such as Intel SGX [3], Sanctum [4] and Keystone [8]. In this
paper, we use Intel SGX as as the exemplary implementation,
but we emphasize that it may use any comparable TEE with
attestation capabilities.
Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) [3] provides a
widely used TEE implementation for general-purpose com-
putation, which is known as enclaves in SGX. Code running
inside a enclaves has a protected address space. When data
from a enclave moves off the processor to memory, it is trans-
parently encrypted with keys only available to the processor.
Thus the operating system, hypervisor, and other users cannot
access the enclaves memory. In the enclave, the code and
data are measured at the startup stage and the measurement
is signed into an attestation report based on a hardware-based
root of trust. The report can be verified to show the unmodified
enclave code logical, by which users can confirm the security
of enclave and provision the secret into the enclave at runtime,
which is called remote attestation protocol.
Due to the powerful functions of SGX, many applications
based on SGX have appeared. For example, Schuster et al.
[12] presented VC3, a cloud data analytics framework based
on SGX, which allows users to run distributed MapReduce
computations in the cloud while keeping their code and
data secret. Zhang et al. [14] presented Town Crier, which
adopts a TEE to enable a secure data-feed for blockchain
smart contracts. Cheng et al. [2] presented Ekiden, a system
uses a TEE to achieve scalable and private smart contracts.
Bentov et al. [1] proposed Tesseract, a secure muti-blockchain
cryptocurrency exchange by using a TEE .
B. Blockchain-based Data Trading
Recent years have witnessed a surge of studies on
blockchain-based data trading. For example, Wang et al.
[13] proposed a data trading scheme based on the Bitcoin
system. In their scheme, the digital content is encrypted by a
symmetric key, and then the symmetric key is encrypted by the
RSA scheme. Only the user who paid for the digital content
through the Bitcoin system can get the RSA private key for
decryption. However, their scheme does not guarantee that the
RSA private key provided by the digital content seller is the
RSA private key used for encryption.
Zhao et al. [15] proposed a blockchain-based fair data
trading protocol in big data market, which integrates ring
signature, double-authentication-preventing signature and sim-
ilarity learning to guarantee the availability of trading data,
privacy of data providers and fairness of the transaction.
However, the market manager in their scheme may collude
with data sellers to deceive data consumers.
Dib et al. [6] proposed a novel framework based on
blockchain, which combines a separate secure environment to
execute a model on top of data to protect the confidentiality of
personal data. However, they assumed that data owners in their
system is honest, which is not suitable for most data trading
scenarios.
Dai et al. [5] proposed SDTE, a blockchain-based data
trading ecosystem. In SDTE, buyers of data cannot directly
access the original data they purchased, and can only obtains
the analysis results of the data, which is generated from Intel
SGX. To ensure fair payment, the data from different data
sellers will be calculated in different SGX, the result with the
most votes will be regarded as the final result, and the data
seller who votes the final result is regarded as an honest one
and will be rewarded by buyer. However, if there are too many
malicious data sellers in a transaction, honest data sellers will
not be able to get reasonable compensation.
Therefore, it is still a challenge to ensure the fair payment
in blockchain-based data trading. This paper is inspired a lot
by [6] and [5], the main difference is that they both use TEE
to protect the confidentiality of data during data processing.
Instead, we use TEE to build a trusted exchange, which is
used to achieve fair data transmission.
III. THE PROPOSED FRAMEWORK
In this section, we present the proposed data trading frame-
work. We first start by introducing the overview of our
framework. We then present notations used in our proposal.
Finally, we explain two main workflows of the framework,
namely: requirements matching and trading.
A. Overview of BDTF
As shown in Fig. 1. There are three participants in BDTF,
namely: data seller, data buyer and trusted data trading plat-
form (TDTP).
Data seller: A data seller can be any entity that have the
right to sell a data item. They can get ether ( For ease of
notation, we use ether as the exemplary cryptocurrencies in
BDTF) by selling the data they own.
Data buyer: Data buyers are people or organizations who
have a need for data. They broadcast their data demands and
complete the purchase of data through a data trading platform.
Trusted data trading platform: Trusted data trading plat-
form (TDTP) is a blockchain network, it consists of two kinds
of nodes. The one is normal node, it runs a TDTP client and
only participate in the consensus of the blockchain. The other
one is trusted exchange, which not only runs a TDTP client
for consensus, but also runs a trusted trading program in the
enclave, which is used to achieve fair data transmission. In
TDTP, each node that supports TEE can become a trusted
exchange, and they can make profits by assisting in fair data
transmission.
In a simplified trading process, the data buyer first board-
casts his/her data demand on TDTP and finds suitable data
seller based on the data of interest. After that, the data buyer
selects a trusted exchange on TDTP, and informs the data seller
the address of the trusted exchange. Then the data seller sends
the data to the trusted exchanges enclave. Finally, only after
the trusted trading program running in the trusted exchanges
enclave has detected that the data buyer has paid the data seller
can the data buyer receive the data from the enclave.
Fig. 1. Overview of BDTF
To detect payments from data buyers to data sellers, there
is a first-in-first-out (FIFO) queue stored inside the trusted
exchanges enclave, and the size of the queue is set according
to a parameter that specifies the maximum time window that
the enclave maintains. The enclave receives the latest block
headers from the untrusted TDTP client that runs on the same
trusted exchange and put these block headers into the FIFO
queue at runtime. After that, the trusted trading program will
detect payment records in the block headers stored in the FIFO
queue.
To ensure that the detected payment records are authenticity
and valid, the enclave verifies the authenticity of each received
block header before placing it into the FIFO queue. Specifi-
cally, the enclave judges the authenticity of each block header
by verifying whether the hash of the previous block stored in
the block header is correct and whether the difficulty of the
block meets the current difficult level of the consensus protocol
rule adopted by TDTP, such as proof-of-work. In addition, the
trusted trading program running in the enclave is hardcoded
with the hash of the TDTP genesis block, or a more recent
checkpoint block of the TDTP. These prevent enclave from
putting a low-difficulty fake chain to the FIFO queue.
B. Summary of Notations
A summary of notations used in our proposal is presented
in Table I.
TABLE I
SUMMARY OF NOTATIONS
Notation Explanation
Arole Blockchain address of role
IP role The IP address of role
E(role1,role2) Evidence of payment from role1 to role2
Krole An AES-256 key created by role
ID Transaction id generated by trusted exchange
P The price of data
C. Workflow
To describe how the framework works, we introduce two
main workflows of the system.
1) Requirements Matching: Before open a trade, the data
buyer needs to find appropriate data source through TDTP. We
define this process as requirements matching and Fig. 2 shows
more detail about it.
• Step1: When a data buyer wants to buy data through
TDTP, he/she will first broadcast his/her trading demand
on TDTP. The broadcast message contains the following:
data specifications, P and Contact address of the data
buyer (such as IP address IP buyer).
• Step 2: Data sellers receive the trading demands broad-
casted by data buyers through their own client. They
will check that whether the data they own meet the data
specifications and whether the bid price is appropriate to
Fig. 2. The process of requirements matching in TDTP
decide whether to respond to a trading demand.
• Step 3: The data seller replys Aseller and IP seller to
the data buyer through the IP buyer in the broadcasted
message.
• Step 4: The data buyer selects data seller based on the
data of interest and the historical reviews to the data
seller, which are recorded in the TDTP.
• Step 5: The data buyer informs the appropriate data seller
to conduct the transaction through IP seller. Then the data
buyer negotiates a trusted exchange for the transaction
with the data seller.
2) Trading: After requirements matching, the data buyer
and data seller have agreed on the trading price and the trusted
exchange used for the transaction. The process of trading is
shown in Fig. 3.
• Step 1: The data buyer performs remote attestation of
the trusted exchanges enclave to verify that trusted trad-
ing program is loaded and run correctly. If the remote
attestation result is correct, the data buyer goes to next
step.
• Step 2: The data buyer deposits ether to the blockchain
address of the trusted exchange owner Aexchange to buy
the service provided by the trusted exchange.
• Step 3: After the deposit transaction is confirmed on
the blockchain, the data buyer transforms the confirmed
deposit into evidence E(buyer,exchange). E(buyer,exchange)
consists of the transaction that spends the ether into
the blockchain address of the trusted exchange owner
Aexchange, as well as an authentication path that consists
of the sibling nodes in the Merkle tree whose root is
stored in a block header, and the index of that block. After
that, the data buyer sends E(buyer,exchange), P, Abuyer and
Aseller to the enclave.
• Step 4: The trusted trading program running in the
enclave decides whether to provide service to the data
buyer by verifying whether E(buyer,exchange) is valid. If
the deposit transaction is valid, which not only means that
the enclave detected the deposit transaction in a block, but
Fig. 3. The process of trading in TDTP
also that the block containing the deposit transaction is
buried under enough additional confirmations, the enclave
will generate a transaction id ID, by which the trusted
exchange can identify whether a user have permission
to use the service, then record ID, P, Abuyer, Aseller,
IP buyer and timestamp of the deposit transaction to a
pending transaction table, which be refreshed every once
in a while and transactions that have not been completed
for a long time will be eliminated. After the above
operations are completed, the trusted exchange will send
ID to the data buyer through IP buyer.
• Step 5: The data buyer sends ID and an AES-256 key
Kbuyer, which is used for encrypting data, to the data
seller.
• Step 6: The data seller performs remote attestation of the
trusted exchanges enclave to verify that trusted trading
program is loaded and run correctly. If the remote attes-
tation result is correct, the data seller goes to next step.
• Step 7: The data buyer verifies whether (ID, P, Abuyer,
Aseller) are set correctly in enclave. If all the parameters
are correctly, the data seller will go to step 8.
• Step 8: The data seller first encrypts the data using
Kbuyer, then sends the encrypted data and ID to the
enclave.
• Step 9: After received the data sent by the data seller, the
enclave consults the pending transaction table based on
the ID provided by the data seller, and sends a small part
of the encrypted data to IP buyer, which is recorded in
the pending transaction table.
• Step 10: The data buyer decrypts the data received and
verifies whether the data is what he/she wants. If the
data buyer finds that the data does not match, he/she can
terminate the transaction at this step.
• Step 11: The data buyer deposits ether to Aseller.
• Step 12: After the deposit transaction is confirmed on the
blockchain, the data buyer sends ID and E(buyer,seller) to
the enclave.
• Step 13: The enclave verifies that the deposit transaction
is valid, and checks whether P, Abuyer and Aseller in
the deposit transaction are consistent with the pending
transaction table. If everything is correct, the enclave will
send data to the data buyer through the IP buyer .
• Step 14: After the data purchase is completed, the data
buyer can post review to the data seller according to the
quality of the data, and can also post review to the trusted
exchange owner according to the services provided by
the trusted exchange. Due to the immutability of the
blockchain, all reviews will be faithfully recorded on
TDTP, later users will be able to refer to these information
to select data sellers and trusted exchanges.
• Step 15: The enclave deletes completed or timeout trans-
actions from the pending transaction table according to
the timestamp recorded in the table, and the data related
to these transactions will also be deleted.
IV. SECURITY AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we conduct a security and performance
analysis of the entire framework. We first analyze the possible
attack of every malicious participant. Then a performance
evaluation is performed.
A. Security Analysis
1) Malicious data seller: A malicious data seller may sell
fake or mismatched data to the data buyer. To solve this
problem, the data buyer can view the historical trading reviews
to the data seller on TDTP to decide whether to trade with the
data seller. In addition, after the data buyer sends the data to
the enclave, the data buyer can view a small part of the data
to verify whether the data provided by the data seller is what
he/she wants. If the data seller provides fake or mismatched
data, the data buyer can refuse payment.
Finally, after the transaction is completed, the data buyer
can give review to the data seller on the TDTP. The malicious
data seller will receive a bad review, which will affect his/her
future earnings.
2) Malicious data buyer: A malicious data buyer may
refuse to pay after receiving the authentic data. However, in
our solution, the trusted trading program running in the trusted
exchanges enclave will only send data to the data buyer when
it detects that the data buyer’s payment to the data seller has
been confirmed.
A malicious data buyer may also launch a double-spend
attack. In order to deal with this possible attack, the enclave
will only consider a payment record valid after it is buried
under enough additional confirmations.
3) Malicious trusted exchange: Our scheme requires that
the source code of the trusted trading program running in the
enclave is open source, so we assume that the trusted trading
program is trusted. However, after the data buyer paid to the
data seller, a malicious trusted exchange may shut down and
stop working, which will prevent the data buyer from getting
the data. To avoid this risk, the data buyer and data seller can
choose multiple trusted exchanges to conduct a trading. In this
case, when the data seller sends data, he/she needs to send the
same data to multiple enclaves. The data buyer only need to
pay once can he download data from these enclaves, which
greatly reduces the risk of single point of failure/attack.
Besides, a malicious trusted exchange may feed a low-
difficulty fake chain to the enclave, the solution to this attack
has been introduced in Section III.
After the transaction is completed, the data buyer can also
give review to the service provided by the trusted exchange,
and the malicious trusted exchange will receive a bad review,
which will affect its future earnings.
B. Performance Analysis
As described in the previous section, the TDTP composed
of two kinds of node, namely normal node and trusted ex-
change. The TDTP client running on both nodes constitutes
a blockchain. Although in addition to the TDTP client, an
enclave is running on the trusted exchange, it does not affect
the performance of the blockchain. Therefore, to analyze the
performance of the whole solution, it suffices to separately
analyze the performance of the blockchain and the trusted
exchange .
To analyze the performance of the blockchain, we took
Ganache 1, a local and virtual Ethereum blockchain for testing,
as the blockchain base. And we used web3.js, a popular
library for JavaScript that allows programmers to interact with
the Ethereum blockchain, to randomly send ether transfer
transactions and reviews from one account to another. We
tested the transactions throughput and the validation latency of
the blockchain. The former means the number of transactions
that the blockchain can validate per second, and the latter
means the time required to validate one single transaction.
These two indicators are analyzed versus the frequency of
transactions that are sent to the blockchain. To ensure the
accuracy of the results, our experiment was repeated 100 times.
The results in Fig. 4 indicate that number of transactions
validated per second is impacted by the transactions frequency.
Up to 300 transactions per second, the throughput is optimal.
When the throughput is greater than 300, the average through-
put begins to lag behind the frequency of transactions.
The results in Fig. 5 show that the time required to vali-
date a transaction increases as the frequency of transactions
increases. Due to the throughput lags behind the frequency of
transactions, the maximum latency increases a lot, after the
frequency of transactions is greater than 300.
1https://github.com/trufflesuite/ganache
Fig. 4. The throughput of blockchain
Fig. 5. The latency of blockchain
We also implemented a prototype of trusted exchange on
a desktop with an Intel i7-7700 CPU and 16GB memory.
We measured the enclave response time for handing service
requests from data buyers. The experiment was repeated 1000
times, and we found that the trusted exchange can respond to
requests quickly, the average time we got for the process is
42ms, 38ms in the best case and 47 ms in the worst case.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented the design of BDTF, a
blockchain-based decentralized framework for data trading.
We analyzed that the conventional centralized data trading
platform may be dishonest and harm the interests of both
parties to the transaction. We formalized BDTF to address
this issue. In our solution, we used blockchain to allow data
buyers and data sellers conduct transactions directly. And
we built a trusted exchange by using Intel SGX to achieve
fair data transmission for data trading. Besides, we analyzed
the security and performance of the proposed framework,
the results demonstrated that our framework can effectively
guarantee the fair completion of data tradings.
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